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Tick data on the S&P 500 futures contract and newswire searches are used to match events to large
one-to five-minute stock price changes. Sixty-nine events that led to large stock price changes are
identified between 1982 and 1999, 53 of which are directly or indirectly related to monetary policy.
Many large stock price changes have no events associated with them.
1. Introduction
Although it is obvious that stock prices respond to events, it is not easy to match particular events to
particular changes in stock prices. For example, Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) chose the
50 largest daily changes in the S&P  500 index from 1946 through 1987 and attempted to find an
explanation of each change in the next day’s New York Times. They found few cases in which it could
be said with any confidence that a particular event led to the change. A problem with studies like this is
that the daily interval may be too long, since many events can take place in a 24-hour period.
In this paper tick data on the S&P 500 futures contract and newswire searches are used to match
events to stock price changes. The tick data are used to create one-to five-minute price changes.
Although it is somewhat arbitrary what one takes as a “large” price change, for purposes of this study
“large” is taken to be a one-to five-minute change greater than or equal to 0.75% in absolute value.
The standard deviation of the 1,918,678 one-minute price changes computed in this study is 0.048%,
and the standard deviation of the 1,688,955 five-minute price changes is 0.112%. A change of 0.75%
is thus a very large change.
Given each large change, newswires were searched to see if an event could be found that led to the
change. Table 1, which is at the end of this paper, lists the large price changes and the events that
were found. This paper is essentially a discussion of Table 1. There are 4,417 trading days in the
dataset (between 21 April 1982 and 29 October 1999), and in 220 of these days at least one large
price change occurred, ie a one-to five-minute change greater than or equal to 0.75% in absolute
value. Events were found for 69 of these days.
Knowledge of the 69 events in Table 1 may prove useful in other studies. Each of these events is big
in that it changed the total value of US equities by a large amount rapidly. This information may be
useful in examining changes in individual stock prices, both absolute and relative to price changes of
other stocks. From a macroeconomic perspective, the events are macro shocks, and knowledge of
these shocks may be useful in examining various macroeconomic questions.
It is important to stress that this study is purely descriptive. No attempt is made to explain why a
particular event led to the large price change, why other similar events did not lead to large price
changes, why many large price changes have no events associated with them, and so on. The main
contribution of this paper is simply to list the 69 events.
2
1
  Cowles Foundation and International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven, CT  06520-8281. Voice:
203-432  3715; Fax: 203-432-6167; email: ray.fair@yale.edu; website: http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu. I am indebted to
William Nordhaus and Sharon Oster for helpful comments.
2
  There does not appear to be other studies in which events have been identified in the way done in this paper. Mitchell and
Mulherin (1994) and Berry and Howe (1994) examine the effects of the amount of news per unit of time on stock prices and
trading volume. Niederhoffer (1971) examines the effects of the world events on daily stock prices. Boyd, Hu and
Jagannathan (1999) examine daily S&P 500 changes around days in which there is an employment announcement. French
and Roll (1986) examine the volatility of individual stock prices during trading and non-trading hours. Wood, McInsh and Ord
(1985) examine the behaviour of a minute-by-minute market return index. Harris (1986) examines the behaviour of portfolio
returns over 15-minute intervals. A number of studies have examined the effects of announcements on daily changes in
stock prices, and these studies are discussed in Section 4.10 BIS Papers No 2
It is also important to stress that with a very few exceptions it is almost certain that each of the
69 events listed in Table 1 caused the particular price change. The events can thus be interpreted as
“facts”. For example, it is almost certain that the five-minute price decrease of 0.79% on 16 July 1982
was essentially all due to the 4.10 pm money supply announcement (see line 8, Table 1). There would
likely have been, of course, a price change had there been no announcement, since the price
generally changes each minute, but with a standard deviation of 0.112%, a typical price change is very
small relative to a change of 0.79%. For all intents and purposes one can attribute all of the price
change to the money supply announcement.
A way of thinking about the events is the following. Consider asking stock brokers a few minutes after
the occurrence of one of the price changes in Table 1 that is associated with an event what led, if
anything, to the change. The main point here is that almost without exception the brokers would say
the event. Some events may have been missed - more will be said about this later - but there is little
doubt that each of the 69 events chosen led to the particular price change.
The construction of Table 1 is discussed in Section 2, and the results are discussed in Sections 3
and 4.
2. The construction of Table 1
The price of an S&P 500 futures contract follows closely the value of the S&P 500 index. Since the
S&P 500 index includes most US stocks by market value, the price of an S&P 500 futures contract is a
good indicator of the total value of US equities. Tick data are available for the S&P 500 futures
contracts from April 1982 on.
3 For “Regular Trading Hours” (RTH) the tick data per day begin at
10.00 am prior to 30 September 1985, and at 9.30 am after that.
4 The RTH data end at 4.15pm, which
is 15 minutes after the regular market has closed. Beginning in 1994 the contracts were traded after
hours on the GLOBEX market, and tick data are available for these trades as well. These data begin
at 4.30 pm and end at 9.15 am the next day. The GLOBEX market is closed Friday night and all day
Saturday. It opens at 6.30 pm Sunday night.
For this study the RTH data begin in 21 April 1982 and end in 29 October 1999. Data are missing for
the last half of December 1991 - the 1991 data end 13 December. The GLOBEX data begin in
4 January 1994 and end in 29 October 1999. Data are missing for the last half of 1998 - the 1998
GLOBEX data end 31 July. Many government announcements of macroeconomic data occur at
8.30 am, and since the GLOBEX market is open at this time, it can respond immediately to these
announcements. Had the GLOBEX market been in existence back to 1982 and tick data been
available, it is likely that many more large price changes and associated events would have been
found. It is also likely that a number of large price changes and associated events would have been
found in GLOBEX data for the last half of 1998 had the data been available.
The one-minute price change was taken to be the price of the last trade in the current minute interval
less the price of the last trade in the previous minute interval (all changes in % terms). The two-minute
price change was taken to be the price of the last trade in the current minute interval less the price of
the last trade in the minute interval two minutes ago, and so on through five-minute price change.
Table 1 lists the following (a large change is always a change greater than or equal to 0.75% in
absolute value): (1) all large one-minute price changes; (2) all large two-minute price changes except
when at least one of the two one-minute price changes is large; (3) all large three-minute price
changes except when at least one of the two two-minute price changes is large; (4) all large
four-minute price changes except when at least one of the four one-minute price changes is large or at
least one of the three two-minute price changes is large or at least on of the two three-minute price
changes is large, and; (5) all large five-minute price changes except when at least one of the five
one-minute price changes is large or at least one of the four two-minute price changes is large or at
least one of the three three-minute price changes is large or at least one of the two four-minute price
changes is large. This procedure finds all the large one- through five-minute price changes without
3
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duplication. The most actively traded contract on the particular day was used for these calculations. As
can be seen from Table 1, there were a total of 1,159 changes chosen.
The “end time” in Table 1 is the time at the end of the k-minute change, where k ranges from 1 to 5.
“Vol.” is the total number of ticks in the k-minute interval, and “ave. vol.” is the average number of ticks
per minute.
The next step was to see which event, if any, led to the large and rapid change. The Dow Jones
Interactive service on the internet was used for this purpose. This service allows one to search for
news reports by time of day. The following four news services were searched: Dow Jones News
Service, Associated Press Newswire, New York Times and Wall Street Journal.
For example, the first case in Table 1 is for 24 June 1982, where at 3.28 pm the price had fallen by
0.85% in the last five minutes. For this case the news services were searched for news reports
between 3.00 pm and 4.00 pm to see what happened about 3.23 pm that led to the large change. In
this case no news report was found that seemed likely to have led to change.
In the next case in Table 1 an event was found, which was the 4.10 pm announcement that M1 was
down $2.3 billion. In the two minutes following the annoucement the price rose 0.82%. Although the
regular stock market is closed at 4.00 pm, the RTH market does not close until 4.15 pm, and so the
RTH market has time to respond to the money supply announcements.
In some cases an event was found that seemed almost surely to have led to the price change, but for
which no exact time could be found. In these cases “?time” is used in Table 1 to denote that the exact
time of the event was not found. For the 9 October 1990 change it is not completely clear that the
Brazil event in fact led to the change, and this is indicated by a “(?)” in the table. For the
1 August 1997 change is unclear which of the three events listed led to the change, and this is also
indicated by a “(?)” in the table.
An important government announcement each month is the employment report. This report is released
at 8.30 am, and it contains data from both the household survey and the establishment survey. The
main variable of interest from the household survey is the unemployment rate, and the main two
variables of interest from the establishment survey are the number of jobs (called “payrolls”) and
average hourly earnings. The variable that gets the most attention is the payroll variable, and so the
payroll announcement is listed in Table 1. The “event” is, however, the entire employment report.
To save space in Table 1, not all large changes following an initial large change are listed for a
particular day, especially on highly volatile days. When some changes are omitted, it is always
indicated how many changes are omitted.
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3. Discussion of Table 1
Although, as discussed in Section 1, it is almost certain that each of the 69 events listed in Table 1
caused the particular price change, it may be that some events have been missed (aside from the
missing RTH and GLOBEX data). The most likely error is an event for which there was no news
report. Less likely is a news report that was listed in the search but that was not noticed as an
important event. The number of events missed is likely to be small, probably fewer than ten.
Remember, however, that many more large price changes and events would likely have been found
had the GLOBEX market been in existence prior to 1994.
Assuming that the number of events that have been missed is small, Table 1 shows that there are
many large price changes that are not due to identifiable events. There are, for example, no events
associated with any of the large number of large price changes in October 1987. Regarding the price
changes with no events, consider the thought experiment about stockbrokers mentioned in Section 1.
For the price changes with no associated events in Table 1, what would stockbrokers say a few
minutes after the change? The argument here is that except for the few events that might have been
missed in the newswire searches, the brokers would not come up with a unique event. Some might
5
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say there was no event, and some might mention something non-specific like “profit taking”, “renewed
confidence”, “interest rate fears” and the like.
It should be stressed that the events that have been found are not necessarily surprises in the sense
of an actual value differing from an expected value, although most of them probably are. Consider, for
example, a payroll announcement. Say that market participants believe that there are three possible
outcomes regarding the payroll change: 100,000, 300,000 and 500,000 jobs. Assume that market
participants weight each possibility equally, so that the expected value is 300,000. Assume also that
the participants expect that the Fed will leave the funds rate unchanged if the outcome is 100,000 or
300,000, but raise the funds rate if the outcome is 500,000. Assume finally that participants expect the
S&P 500 price to be 1,430 if there is no funds rate change and 1,400 if there is one. The expected
value of the price is thus 1,420, which if the participants are risk neutral will be the price before the
announcement. In this case even if the actual payroll value is equal to the expected value (300,000),
the stock price will change (from 1,420 to 1,430). Simply relieving uncertainty may thus change stock
prices even if the announced value is equal to the expected value. The events that have been found
are thus not necessarily surprises.
The main results from Table 1 are the following. First, the breakdown of the 69 events is:
•   Twenty-two events are money supply or interest rate announcements or testimony by
monetary authorities. In 1982 the focus was on money supply announcements, and after that
it was on the federal funds rate;
•   fourteen events are payroll announcements (employment reports);
•   eleven events are CPI or PPI or employment cost index announcements;
•   six events concern other macroeconomic announcements (NAPM, retail sales, durable
goods, new homes);
•   five events concern Iraq;
•   four events concern Congressional issues;
•   three events concern Brazil or Mexico;
•   one event is fear of Larry Summers.
The 31 non-monetary macroeconomic announcements (payroll, CPI, PPI, employment cost and other)
are indirectly related to monetary policy in that these announcements may change people’s
expectations about future monetary policy. If, for example, there is a large payroll increase, people
may think it is more likely that the Fed will tighten in the future because of fear of inflation. If these 31
announcements are added to the 22 direct monetary policy events, this gives 53 of the 69 events that
are directly or indirectly related to monetary policy.
Second, the largest response by far was to the cut in the federal funds rate at 3.14 pm on
15  October  1998. The first five one-minute price changes following this announcement were 0.89,
1.00. 1.00, 1.29 and 1.00%. This is roughly a 5% increase in five minutes. The announcement of this
rate cut was unusual in that it did not follow a normally scheduled FOMC meeting.
Third, the large price changes are not close to being spread evenly across years. Between 1982 and
1993, before the introduction of the GLOBEX market, the number of days of large price changes per
year are respectively: 43, 2, 2, 0, 12, 33, 6, 4, 18, 8, 3 and 1. Between 1994 and 1999 the number of
days are respectively: 5, 0, 12, 26, 22 (GLOBEX data for the last half of 1998 missing) and 23 (through
October).
Finally, as noted above, many large price changes have no events associated with them.
4. Implications for other studies
It seems clear that no simple model of stock price determination can explain the facts in Table 1.
There have, for example, been hundreds of important macroeconomic announcements between 1982
and 1999, and only a small fraction have led to a large stock price change. An adequate model would
need to explain why the particular events in Table 1 led to large price changes, while many other
seemingly similar events did not. There is also the problem from a model building perspective that
there are many large price changes for which there appear to be no obvious causes.BIS Papers No 2 13
A number of statistical studies have examined the effects of announcements on daily changes in stock
prices (ie the change from the close of one day to the close of the previous day). The daily % change
in a stock index is regressed on estimates of the “surprise” components of announcements, and the
components are tested for their statistical significance. The surprise component of an announcement
is the difference between the announced value and an estimate of its expected value. The expected
value is usually either taken from a survey or to be a prediction from an autoregressive equation.
This literature generally finds that surprise monetary announcements are significant, but little else
seems to matter. Schwert (1981), Pearce and Roley (1985) and Hardouvelis (1987) find surprise
monetary announcements significant, and McQueen and Roley (1993) find inflation surprises
sometimes significant after controlling for different stages of the business cycle. Jain (1988) finds
surprise monetary and CPI announcements significant. The results in Table 1 suggest that if anything
is to be found significant in explaining stock prices it is likely to be monetary announcements, which is
what the literature tends to find. The “facts” in Table 1 thus provide some support to the statistical
results using daily data, but they also suggest that an adequate model of stock price determination is
likely to be more complicated than the models that have been used so far for the statistical tests.
As noted in Section 1, Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) chose the 50 largest daily changes in the
S&P 500 index from the 1946 through 1987 and attempted to find an explanation of each change in
the next day’s New York Times. Of the 50 changes, 17 occurred between 1982 and 1987, which are
years included in Table 1. It is interesting that five of these 17 changes occurred on days not listed in
Table 1, in other words, on days in which there was not at least one large one- to five-minute price
change. Of the 12 changes that occurred on days that are listed in Table 1, none of the price changes
has an even associated with it. Table 2 lists the 12 changes and the New York Times explanation that
Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989, Table 4) found. It is clear that none of the explanations in
Table 2 are obvious causes of the stock price changes. The results in Table 1 are consistent with this
in that no events could be found to explain the large price changes on these days.
Haugen, Talmor and Torous (1991) examine daily changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average
between 1897 and 1988. They compute a measure of volatility using the daily data and choose
periods of increased and decreased volatility. For the 217 periods of increased volatility that were
chosen, they identified events for 28 of them. For the 224 periods of decreased volatility, they
identified 18 events. Again, it is difficult with daily data to find events, which is probably the main
reason they found so few events over such a long period of time.
Table 2
Twelve large daily S&P 500 price changes
Day Percent
change New York Times explanation
08.17.82 4.76 Interest rates decline.
08.20.82 3.54 Congress passes Reagan tax bill; prime rate falls.
11.30.82 3.22 “Analysts were at a loss to explain why the Dow jumped so dramatically in the last two hours
09.11.86 – 4.81 Foreign governments refuse to lower interest rates; crackdown on triple witching announced
10.16.87 – 5.16 Fear of trade deficit; fear of higher interest rates; tension with Iran.
10.19.87 – 20.47 Worry over dollar decline and trade deficit; fear of US not supporting dollar.
10.20.87 5.33 Investors looking for “quality stocks”.
10.21.87 9.10 Interest rates continue to fall; deficit talks in Washington; bargain hunting.
10.22.87 – 3.92 Iranian attack on Kuwait oil terminal; fall in markets overseas; analysts predict lower prices.
10.26.87 – 8.28 Fear of budget deficits; margin calls; reaction to falling foreign stocks.
10.29.87 4.46 Deficit reduction talks begin; durable goods orders increase; rallies overseas.
10.30.87 3.33 Dollar stabilises; increase in prices abroad.
Taken from Table 4 in Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989).14 BIS Papers No 2
Fleming and Remolona (1997) (FR) examine five-minute price changes for the five year US Treasury
note for the period 23 August 1993 - 19 August 1994. They chose the 25 largest five-minute price
changes over this period, and they find that each of these changes was preceded by a
macroeconomic announcement. Of these 25 changes, 17 are on days for which S&P 500 futures data
exist. Data for these 17 days are presented in Table 3. The five-minute bond price change is
presented (taken from Table 3 in Fleming and Remolona (1997)) along with the five-minute S&P 500
futures price change.
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The stock price changes in Table 3 are in general fairly large, although not nearly as large as 0.75%,
the Table 1 cutoff. It is remarkable that in every case except the last one the bond and stock price
changes are in the same direction. The direction is the same in the last case if the same time
1.45-1.50pm is used, but not if 1.16-1.21 pm is used for the stock price. As FR point out (p32), bond
and stock prices need not move in the same direction following an announcement, since stock prices
depend on expectations of both earnings and interest rates, whereas bond prices depend only on
expectations of interest rates. The fact that they do move in the same direction suggests that the
announcements mostly affect interest rate expectations.
Finally, Gwilym, McMillan and Speight (1999) examine five-minute stock price changes for the UK
market using FTSE-100 data. The data are for the 24 January 1992 - 30 June 1995 period. Among
other things, their data show that trading volume is higher around announcement times than
otherwise. The results in Table 1 are consistent with this conclusion. For example, note that in general
volume is quite high around the 8.30 am announcements in the table.
5. Conclusion
As mentioned in the Introduction, this study is purely descriptive. By focusing on very short time
intervals, it has been possible to associate particular events with particular stock price changes,
something which is generally not possible to do using daily data. Sixty-nine events have been
identified between 1982 and 1999 that led to a one- to five-minute S&P 500 futures price change
greater than or equal to 0.75% in absolute value. Knowledge of these events may prove useful in both
macroeconomic studies and studies of individual stock prices.
The results in Table 1 suggest that stock price determination is complicated. Many large price changes
correspond to no obvious events, and so many large changes appear to have no easy explanation.
Also, of the hundreds of fairly similar announcements that have taken place between 1982 and 1999,
only a few have led to large price changes (ie those in Table 1), and it does not appear easy to explain
why some do and some do not.
6
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Table 3









01.07.94 8.30-8.35 am 0.282 8.28-8.33 am 0.07 8.30 am: Employment
02.04.94 8.30-8.35 am 0.315 8.29-8.34 am 0.15 8.30 am: Employment
02.04.94 11.05-11.10 am – 0.259 11.04-11.09 am – 0.09 11.05 am: Federal funds rate
02.11.94 8.30-8.35 am 0.223 8.29-8.34 am 0.31 8.30 am: PPI, retail sales
04.13.94 8.30-8.35 am 0.224 8.29-8.34 am 0.10 8.30 am: CPI, retail sales
05.06.94 8.30-8.35 am – 0.536 8.28-8.33 am – 0.14 8.30 am: Employment
05.11.94 1.40-1.45 pm – 0.223 1.40-1.45 pm – 0.37 1.42 pm: 10-year-note auction
results
05.12.94 8.30-8.35 am 0.384 8.29-8.34 am 0.43 8.30 am: PPI, retail sales
05.17.94 2.35-2.40 pm 0.221 2.25-2.30 pm 0.33 2.26 pm: Federal funds rate
2.35-2.40 pm 0.00
05.27.94 8.30-8.35 am – 0.343 8.29-8.34 am 0.20 8.30 am: GDP
06.03.94 8.40-8.45 am – 0.265 8.40-8.45 am – 0.23 8.30 am: Employment
07.08.94 8.30-8.35 am – 0.440 8.29-8.34 am – 0.30 8.30 am: Employment
07.12.94 8.30-8.35 am 0.222 8.29-8.34 am 0.28 8.30 am: PPI
07.14.94 8.30-8.35 am 0.253 8.29-8.34 am 0.11 8.30 am: Retail sales
07.29.94 8.30-8.35 am 0.407 8.29-8.34 am 0.31 8.30 am: GDP
08.05.94 8.30-8.35 am – 0.590 8.29-8.34 am – 0.35 8.30 am: Employment
08.16.94 1.45-1.50 pm – 0.266 1.16-1.21 pm 0.23 1.17 pm: Federal funds rate
1.45-1.50pm – 0.09
Notes: No stock trades at 8.29 am on 1.07.94 and 5.06.94. Changes are percent changes. Bond results and announcement information taken
from Table 3 in Fleming and Remolona (1997).16 BIS Papers No 2
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Table 1
One- to five-minute price changes greater than 0.75% in absolute value
k-minute-change Event
day k end time size vol. ave. vol.
1 06.24.82 5 3.28 pm – 0.85 23 4.6 none
2 06.25.82 2 4.11 pm 0.82 13 6.5 4.10 pm: M1 down $2.3 billion.
3 07.06.82 4 3.36 pm 0.79 25 6.3 none
4 07.08.82 5 3.09 pm 0.78 39 7.8 none
5 07.09.82 3 4.11 pm 0.86 21 7.0 4.10 pm: M1 down $3.7 billion.
6 07.09.82 3 4.12 pm 0.99 22 7.3 –
7 07.13.82 4 12.21 pm 0.77 17 4.3 12.20 pm: IBM profits $1.68 vs. $1.37 year ago.
8 07.16.82 5 4.14 pm – 0.79 43 8.6 4.10 pm: M1 up $5.9 billion
9 08.11.82 4 2.36 pm 0.79 33 8.3 2.30 pm: retail sales up 1.0%
10 08.13.82 2 4.13 pm 0.78 20 10.0 4.10 pm: M1 up $2.0 billion.
11 08.17.82 4 2.20 pm 0.87 22 5.5 none
12 08.19.82 4 10.16 am 0.79 20 5.0 none
13 08.19.82 5 2.08 pm –  0.88 32 6.4 ?time: rumour a major US bank in trouble over
Mexican loans.
14 08.19.82 2 2.09 pm – 0.78 15 7.5 NY Fed denied rumour about 2.30 pm.
15 08.19.82 5 2.14 pm 0.79 46 9.2 –
16 08.19.82 4 2.29 pm 0.93 33 8.3 –
17 08.19.82 5 2.31 pm 0.79 38 7.6 –
18 08.19.82 5 2.32 pm 0.88 34 6.8 –
19 08.19.82 5 2.33 pm 0.93 31 6.2 –
20 08.19.82 4 2.34 pm 0.79 23 5.8 –
21 08.19.82 1 2.38 pm – 0.88 13 13.0 –
22 08.19.82 1 2.40 pm 0.88 12 12.0 –
23 08.19.82 3 2.48 pm – 0.78 21 17.0 –
24 08.19.82 3 2.49 pm – 0.83 17 5.7 –
25 08.20.82 5 3.21 pm 0.77 29 5.8 none
26 08.23.82 5 3.36 pm 0.85 30 6.0 none
27 08.23.82 4 3.37 pm 0.76 24 6.0 –
28 08.23.82 5 3.40 pm 0.80 24 4.8 –
29 08.24.82 3 1.41 pm –  0.78 17 5.7 1.40 pm: GM mid-August sales down to 81,597
from 134,949.
30 08.24.82 5 3.19 pm – 0.77 42 8.4 none
31 08.24.82 5 3.22 pm – 0.77 43 8.6 –
32 08.24.82 5 3.23 pm – 0.82 41 8.2 –
33 09.02.82 3 2.56 pm 0.77 13 4.3 none
34 09.03.82 4 10.04 am 0.78 29 7.3 none
35 09.03.82 3 10.21 am 0.78 33 11.0 –
36 09.03.82 3 10.23 am 0.90 39 13.0 –
37 09.03.82 5 12.43 pm 0.78 22 4.4 –
38 09.03.82 5 1.07 pm – 0.82 34 6.8 –
39 09.03.82 5 1.08 pm – 0.78 33 6.6 –
40 09.03.82 3 1.39 pm 0.82 10 3.3 –
41 09.03.82 4 1.58 pm – 0.82 20 5.0 –
42 09.03.82 5 3.25 pm 0.82 24 4.8 –
43 09.14.82 5 3.34 pm – 0.88 32 6.4 3.27 pm: Rostenkowski said tax boost needed for
defence budget.
44 09.14.82 4 3.35 pm – 0.84 29 7.3 –
45 09.23.82 5 11.12 am – 0.77 27 5.4 ?time: Five Fed Presidents testify before Congress.
46 09.30.82 5 3.38 pm – 0.79 36 7.2 none
47 10.01.82 3 4.12 pm – 0.84 24 8.0 4.10 pm: M1 up $0.4 billion.
48 10.08.82 4 2.27 pm – 0.77 17 4.3 none
49 10.08.82 1 2.28 pm 0.88 6 6.0 –
50 10.08.82 2 4.05 pm 0.85 19 9.5 –
51 10.08.82 2 4.07 pm – 0.96 19 9.5 –
52 10.08.82 3 4.10 pm 0.77 37 12.3 4.10 pm: M1 down $2.7 billion.
53 10.08.82 3 4.11 pm 0.92 42 14.0 –
54 10.11.82 1 2.55 pm – 0.82 4 4.0 none18 BIS Papers No 2
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55 10.11.82 4 3.46 pm 0.82 37 9.3 –
56 10.13.82 3 12.37 pm – 0.78 22 7.3 none
57 10.13.82 3 2.09 pm 0.79 23 7.7 –
58 10.13.82 3 3.23 pm 0.86 24 8.0 –
59 10.13.82 3 3.24 pm 1.01 36 12.0 –
60 10.13.82 2 3.27 pm 0.98 23 11.5 –
61 10.13.82 2 3.29 pm – 0.90 16 8.0 –
62 10.13.82 4 3.56 pm 0.79 18 4.5 –
63 10.22.82 4 4.13 pm – 0.85 59 14.8 4.10 pm: M1 up $3.2 billion.
64 10.26.82 4 2.58 pm – 0.78 23 5.8 none
65 10.26.82 3 2.59 pm – 0.82 15 5.0 –
66 10.26.82 5 3.20 pm 0.82 36 7.2 –
67 10.27.82 5 2.59 pm 0.77 33 6.6 none
68 11.02.82 4 3.34 pm – 0.83 32 8.0 none
69 11.05.82 2 11.46 am – 0.8 17 8.5 none
70 11.05.82 2 11.47 am – 0.98 11 5.5 –
71 11.05.82 3 3.14 pm 0.77 27 9.0 none
72 11.05.82 2 4.10 pm – 0.77 12 6.0 4.10 pm: M1 up $2.7 billion.
73 11.05.82 2 4.11 pm – 0.84 12 6.0 –
74 11.16.82 4 3.15 pm 0.81 35 8.8 ?time: Larry Speaks reported to have said Fed will
reduce discount rate. Denied at 3.33 pm.
75 11.16.82 4 3.16 pm 0.77 33 8.3 –
76 11.16.82 4 3.17 pm 0.77 34 8.5 –
77 11.22.82 5 10.17 am – 0.77 37 7.4 none
78 11.30.82 5 2.53 pm 0.79 40 8.0 none
79 11.30.82 5 2.54 pm 0.82 38 7.6 –
80 12.01.82 5 2.27 pm – 0.82 40 8.0 none
81 12.01.82 4 2.28 pm – 0.82 38 9.5 –
82 12.01.82 5 2.32 pm – 0.78 41 8.2 –
83 12.02.82 4 2.38 pm – 0.75 24 6.0 2.30 pm: New home sales down 0.4%
84 12.06.82 4 3.26 pm 0.75 39 9.8 none
85 12.06.82 4 3.27 pm 0.86 43 10.8 –
86 12.07.82 5 2.55 pm – 0.83 41 8.2 none
87 12.08.82 5 2.48 pm – 0.77 32 6.4 none
88 12.09.82 3 3.24 pm – 0.85 23 7.7 ?time: Howard Baker withdrew capital gains bill.
89 12.14.82 5 1.38 pm – 0.80 33 6.6 none
90 12.14.82 2 2.02 pm – 0.77 9 4.5 –
91 12.14.82 4 3.27 pm – 0.84 30 7.5 –
92 12.15.82 5 10.59 am – 0.80 28 5.6 10.56 am: Murray Weidenbaum testified that deficit
an obstacle to recovery.
93 12.17.82 4 12.00 pm 0.77 7 1.8 none
94 12.21.82 2 3.40 pm 0.77 18 9.0 none
95 12.22.82 5 3.21 pm – 0.78 27 5.4 none
96 12.28.82 3 2.56 pm – 0.80 18 6.0 none
97 01.04.83 5 3.02 pm 0.76 37 7.4 none
98 01.06.83 5 12.09 pm 0.80 50 10.0 none
99 05.30.84 4 2.37 pm 0.80 38 9.5 none
100 08.06.84 5 10.33 am 0.89 70 14.0 none
101 01.08.86 3 3.48 pm – 0.79 48 16.0 none
102 01.08.86 3 3.49 pm – 0.90 63 21.0 –
103 01.08.86 4 3.53 pm 0.77 63 15.8 –
104 01.17.86 4 9.58 am – 0.76 38 9.5 9.54 am: IBM profits $4.36 vs. $3.55 year ago.
105 02.07.86 3 12.02 pm –  1.03 47 15.7 12.00 pm: three judge panel ruled part of
Gramm-Rudman law unconstitutional.
106 02.07.86 2 12.07 pm 0.75 33 16.5 –
107 09.11.86 4 11.36 am – 0.88 59 14.8 none
108 09.11.86 4 11.53 am 0.78 58 14.5 –
109 09.12.86 4 10.05 am – 0.76 33 8.3 none (nine more through 12.16 pm)
119 09.15.86 5 9.36 am 0.78 44 8.8 noneBIS Papers No 2 19
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120 09.18.86 4 9.45 am 0.86 40 10.0 none
121 09.19.86 2 3.31 pm – 0.78 36 18.0 none
122 09.25.86 4 11.01 am – 0.76 46 11.5 none
123 09.25.86 5 11.03 am – 0.83 50 10.0 –
124 10.03.86 5 11.08 am – 0.87 63 12.6 none
125 10.03.86 2 11.09 am – 0.76 21 10.5 –
126 10.03.86 3 11.11 am – 0.80 25 8.3 –
127 10.03.86 3 11.17 am 0.76 28 9.3 –
128 10.06.86 2 10.06 am 0.75 31 15.5 none
129 12.11.86 4 11.15 am – 0.95 46 11.5 none
130 12.11.86 2 11.16 am – 0.79 28 14.0 –
131 01.23.87 4 2.35 pm – 0.76 52 13.0 none (14 more during day)
146 03.09.87 5 9.35 am – 0.86 74 14.8
147 03.09.87 5 9.36 am – 0.81 73 14.6 –
148 03.30.87 5 9.46 am – 0.85 54 10.8 none
149 03.30.87 4 9.47 am – 0.78 42 10.5 –
150 03.30.87 3 9.48 am – 0.95 31 10.3 –
151 04.13.87 5 3.37 pm – 0.81 53 10.6 none
152 04.27.87 4 12.26 pm – 0.76 52 13.0 none
153 04.27.87 4 12.27 pm 0.78 43 10.8 –
154 04.27.87 4 12.42 pm 0.76 47 11.8 –
155 04.27.87 5 12.44 pm 0.80 67 13.4 –
156 04.27.87 5 12.45 pm 0.80 61 12.2 –
157 04.27.87 5 12.46 pm 0.87 66 13.2 –
158 05.11.87 4 4.00 pm – 0.84 48 12.0 none
159 06.02.87 5 10.07 am – 0.91 70 14.0 none
160 06.10.87 5 3.09 pm – 0.75 45 9.0 none
161 06.30.87 2 4.14 pm – 0.77 36 18.0 none
162 10.16.87 5 11.25 am – 0.83 42 8.4 none (12 more during day)
175 10.19.87 1 9.33 am 0.76 7 7.0 none (123 more during day)
299 10.20.87 1 9.31 am 1.78 5 5.0 none (161 more during day)
461 10.21.87 1 9.31 am 1.26 7 7.0 none (82 more during day)
544 10.22.87 1 9.31 am – 3.47 5 5.0 none (109 more during day)
654 10.23.87 1 9.31 am – 1.23 4 4.0 none (33 more during day)
688 10.26.87 1 9.32 am – 0.50 9 9.0 none (22 more during day)
711 10.27.87 1 9.31 am 0.84 9 9.0 none (22 more during day)
734 10.28.87 2 9.37 am 0.80 10 5.0 none (22 more during day)
757 10.29.87 1 9.32 am 1.27 6 6.0 none (7 more during day)
765 10.30.87 4 9.47 am 0.79 28 7.0 none (5 more during day)
771 11.02.87 4 9.34 am – 0.78 38 9.5 none
772 11.02.87 5 9.36 am – 0.78 50 10.0 –
773 11.03.87 2 9.35 am 0.80 19 9.5 none (18 more during day)
792 11.04.87 4 9.46 am 0.77 38 9.5 none
793 11.04.87 3 9.47 am 0.77 26 8.7 –
794 11.05.87 4 9.35 am 0.81 38 9.5 none
795 11.06.87 4 11.41 am 0.78 38 9.5 none
796 11.09.87 5 2.34 pm – 0.83 52 10.4 none
797 11.10.87 5 9.35 am – 0.88 48 9.6 none
798 11.10.87 4 9.36 am – 0.88 39 9.8 –
799 11.10.87 5 10.10 am – 0.82 51 10.2 –
800 11.19.87 2 4.02 pm – 0.75 28 14.5 none20 BIS Papers No 2
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801 12.01.87 4 4.00 pm – 0.77 64 16.0 none
802 12.08.87 4 3.58 pm 0.85 43 10.8 none
803 12.10.87 3 3.39 pm – 0.76 38 12.7 none
804 12.14.87 4 9.37 am 0.78 65 16.3 none
805 12.15.87 5 3.31 pm 0.75 59 11.8 none
806 01.08.88 4 3.39 pm – 0.76 60 15.0 none (4 more through 3.49 pm)
811 01.11.88 2 9.52 am – 0.82 21 10.5 none (7 more through 10.16 am)
819 01.15.88 3 9.43 am – 0.78 31 10.3 none
820 01.21.88 5 10.15 am  0.82 59 11.8 none
821 04.14.88 4 2.30 pm – 0.86 58 14.5 none (6 more through 2.41 pm)
828 04.21.88 5 3.08 pm – 0.81 64 12.8 none
829 10.13.89 3 3.04 pm – 0.75 27 9.0 none (6 more through 3.44 pm)
836 10.16.89 1 9.31 am 1.20 10 10.0 none (18 more during day)
855 10.17.89 5 11.17 am – 0.79 58 11.6 none
856 10.17.89 5 11.25 am 0.88 37 7.4 –
857 10.17.89 5 11.26 am 0.88 41 8.2 –
858 10.24.89 4 10.24 am – 0.78 56 14.0 none (9 more during day)
868 01.12.90 3 9.33 am – 0.86 22 7.3 none
869 01.12.90 4 2.36 pm – 0.90 40 10.0 –
870 01.12.90 4 2.41 pm 0.84 47 11.8 –
871 01.24.90 3 9.39 am – 0.83 25 8.3 none
872 01.24.90 3 9.40 am – 0.77 24 8.0 –
873 01.24.90 1 9.41 am 0.77 7 7.0 –
874 07.23.90 5 10.30 am – 0.75 58 11.6 none
875 07.23.90 4 10.32 am – 0.77 49 12.3 –
876 07.23.90 2 10.33 am – 1.10 19 9.5 –
877 07.23.90 5 10.54 am 0.91 43 8.6 –
878 08.03.90 4 9.47 am – 0.85 31 7.8 ?time: Iraq invaded Kuwait.
879 08.03.90 3 9.48 am – 0.85 19 6.3 –
880 08.03.90 3 9.49 am – 1.13 22 7.3 –
881 08.03.90 5 9.55 am 0.97 34 6.8 –
882 08.03.90 2 1.49 pm – 1.11 14 7.0 –
883 08.03.90 4 2.01 pm 0.88 19 4.8 –
884 08.03.90 5 2.04 pm 0.86 28 5.6 –
885 08.06.90 5 10.27 am 0.84 31 6.2 none
886 08.17.90 3 12.16 pm – 0.78 40 13.3 12.11 pm: Pentagon recommended maybe calling
up reserves.
887 08.21.90 1 11.16  am 0.77 13 13.0 11.13 am: Iraq’s Aziz says ready to discuss Gulf
situation.
888 08.23.90 3 9.46 am 0.96 16 5.3 none
889 09.20.90 4 10.25 am – 0.82 59 14.8 none
890 09.27.90 4 10.59 am – 0.77 50 12.5 none
891 10.01.90 4 12.18 pm 0.76 43 10.8 none
892 10.01.90 4 12.19 pm 0.78 38 9.5 –
893 10.02.90 5 9.39 am 0.78 54 10.8 none
894 10.09.90 4 3.45 pm –  0.79 47 11.8 3.39 pm: (?) Brazil’s central bank president sees
rescheduling needed.
895 10.10.90 3 3.28 pm – 0.88 39 13.0 none
896 10.12.90 3 11.55  am 0.77 31 10.3 11.51 pm: opposition party in exile says Iraqi
leaders considering Kuwait withdrawal.
897 10.15.90 3 10.45 am – 0.82 42 14.0 none
898 10.15.90 2 10.46 am – 0.82 29 14.5 –
899 12.04.90 5 3.33 pm 0.99 45 9.0 ?time: British TV reports Iraq makes new offer on
Kuwait.
900 12.04.90 2 3.34 pm 0.84 20 10.0 –BIS Papers No 2 21
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901 12.18.90 2 3.27 pm 0.84 29 14.5 none
902 12.18.90 3 3.29 pm 0.88 23 7.7 –
903 01.04.91 2 12.12 pm 0.83 20 10.0 none
904 01.09.91 2 1.57 pm – 0.92 22 11.0 none
905 01.09.91 1 1.58 pm – 1.50 10 10.0 –
906 01.09.91 1 1.59 pm – 1.56 6 6.0 –
907 01.09.91 1 2.00 pm 0.94 5 5.0 –
909 01.09.91 2 2.04 pm – 0.78 14 7.0 –
910 01.14.91 4 3.19 pm 0.84 44 11.0 none
911 01.16.91 1 12.43 pm 0.84 12 12.0 none
912 01.17.91 2 9.44 am – 0.93 13 6.5 none
913 01.17.91 4 9.47 am – 0.93 29 7.3 –
914 04.30.91 2 9.32 am 0.87 28 14.0 9.30 am: Fed cut discount rate to 5.5%.
915 05.10.91 5 3.25 pm – 0.78 54 10.8 none
916 11.15.91 4 3.41 pm – 0.81 34 8.5 none
917 11.15.91 4 3.46 pm 0.76 21 5.3 –
918 11.15.91 4 3.47 pm 0.76 27 6.8 –
919 11.19.91 5 10.47 am – 0.81 57 11.4 none
920 01.02.92 5 4.05 pm 0.77 68 13.6 none
921 07.02.92 4 10.21 am – 0.82 62 15.5 ?time: Fed cut discount rate to 3.0% from 3.5%;
922 07.02.92 4 10.22 am 0.87 58 14.5 anemic employment report earlier.
923 10.05.92 5 10.21 am – 0.78 57 11.4 none
924 10.05.92 3 10.26 am – 0.83 33 11.0 –
925 10.05.92 3 10.27 am – 0.78 24 8.0 –
926 10.05.92 3 11.16 am – 0.86 27 9.0 –
927 02.16.93 5 10.43 am – 0.79 55 11.0 none
928 03.02.94 1 5.15 am – 1.52 4 4.0 none
929 03.31.94 5 10.55 am – 0.78 52 10.4 none
930 03.31.94 5 10.57 am – 0.76 45 9.0 –
931 03.31.94 4 11.07 am 0.75 27 6.8 –
932 10.13.94 4 8.33 am 0.75 70 17.5 8.30 am: PPI down 0.5; core up 0.1%
933 11.15.94 3 2.38 pm – 0.83 38 12.7 2.37 pm: Fed raised discount rate to 4.75% from
4.0%
934 11.22.94 4 3.51 pm – 0.81 47 11.8 none
935 02.26.96 5 3.27 pm – 0.76 79 15.8 none
936 02.26.96 5 3.28 pm – 0.76 70 14.0 –
937 03.08.96 4 8.33 am – 0.79 110 27.5 8.30 am: payrolls up 705,000; largest increase in 12
years.
938 03.08.96 1 8.34 am – 0.75 17 17.0 –
939 03.08.96 2 3.03 pm – 0.80 21 10.5 none
940 03.08.96 4 3.27 pm 0.77 31 7.8 –
941 03.08.96 4 3.28 pm 0.77 26 6.5 –
942 04.10.96 4 3.43 pm – 0.76 46 11.5 none
943 05.03.96 4 8.30 am 0.78 89 22.3 8.30 am: payrolls up 2,000
944 05.03.96 4 8.31 am 0.89 120 30.0 –
945 05.03.96 3 8.32 am 0.96 137 45.7 –
946 05.03.96 3 8.35 am – 0.77 172 57.3 –
947 06.07.96 2 8.31 am – 0.93 94 47.0 8.30 am: payrolls up 348,000
948 06.07.96 3 8.33 am – 0.84 123 41.0 –
949 06.07.96 3 8.34 am – 0.93 124 41.3 –
950 07.11.96 3 1.44 pm – 0.79 20 6.7 none
951 07.15.96 4 3.29 pm – 0.85 40 10.0 none
952 07.16.96 4 12.22 pm – 0.84 40 10.0 none (7 more during day).22 BIS Papers No 2
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960 08.02.96 2 8.31 am 1.02 91 45.5 8.30 am: payrolls up 193,000.
961 09.06.96 1 8.30 am 0.81 61 61.0 8.30 am: payrolls up 250,000.
962 09.13.96 3 8.32 am 0.84 123 41.0 8.30 am: CPI up 0.1%; core up 0.1%. Also retail
sales data.
963 12.11.96 5 2.12 am 0.80 31 6.2 none
964 01.23.97 4 3.46 pm – 0.84 27 6.8 none
965 01.23.97 5 3.48 pm – 0.76 35 7.0 –
966 01.23.97 5 3.55 pm – 0.75 41 8.2 –
967 01.23.97 4 4.00 pm 0.76 37 9.3 –
968 01.29.97 3 8.31 am 0.76 91 30.3 8.30 am: durable goods down 1.7%.
969 02.05.97 3 3.40 pm 0.76 23 7.7 none
970 02.26.97 4 10.04 am – 0.97 35 8.8 10.00 am: Greenspan testimony; angst about stock
market.
971 02.26.97 2 10.05 am – 0.86 14 7.0 –
972 03.07.97 1 8.30 am – 0.81 48 48.0 8.30 am: payrolls up 339,000.
973 03.07.97 2 8.32 am 0.75 87 43.5 –
974 03.27.97 4 3.37 pm – 0.87 30 7.5 none
975 03.27.97 4 3.45 pm 0.75 26 6.5 –
976 04.15.97 3 8.31 am 0.78 115 38.3 8.30 am: CPI up 0.1%; core up 0.2%.
977 04.15.97 3 8.32 am 0.99 182 60.7 –
978 04.29.97 2 8.31  am 1.09 106 53.0 8.30 am: employment cost index up 0.6% in first
quarter.
979 05.20.97 4 2.17 pm 0.82 51 12.8 2.15 pm: Fed kept rates unchanged.
980 06.06.97 1 8.31 am – 0.88 77 77.0 8.30 am: payrolls up 138,000.
981 07.09.97 4 3.38 pm – 0.75 43 10.8 none
982 07.18.97 4 10.08 am – 0.80 44 11.0 none
983 08.01.97 3 10.11 am –  0.94 24 8.0 10.00 am: ? new orders up 1.2%; strong NAPM
report; Michigan sentiment revised up.
984 08.08.97 2 8.29 am – 0.89 39 19.5 none???
985 08.08.97 3 8.32 am 0.76 65 21.7 –
986 08.13.97 4 8.31  am 0.79 164 41.0 8.30 am: PPI down 0.1%; core down 0.1%. Also
retail sales data.
987 08.13.97 4 8.32 am 0.85 226 56.5 –
988 08.13.97 4 8.33 am 1.04 265 66.3 –
989 08.13.97 3 8.34 am 0.84 192 64.0 –
990 08.13.97 5 10.22 am – 0.82 64 12.8 none
991 08.13.97 3 10.23 am – 0.77 38 12.7 –
992 08.13.97 3 10.24 am – 0.77 34 11.3 –
993 08.22.97 5 3.53 pm 0.83 57 11.4 none
994 09.02.97 2 10.03 am 0.84 22 11.0 10.00 am: NAPM 56.8 vs. 58.6 last month.
995 10.03.97 2 8.31 am – 0.77 97 48.5 8.30 am: payrolls up 215,000.
996 10.10.97 1 8.30 am – 0.82 73 73.0 8.30 am: PPI up 0.5%; core up 0.4%.
997 10.27.97 3 1.52 pm – 0.85 28 9.3 none
998 10.27.97 4 1.55 pm – 0.80 42 10.5 –
999 10.27.97 2 1.56 pm – 0.80 13 6.5 –
1000 10.27.97 2 3.12 pm – 1.17 20 10.0 –
1001 10.27.97 2 3.13 pm – 0.96 22 11.0 –
1002 10.27.97 4 3.23 pm – 0.96 27 6.8 –
1003 10.27.97 3 3.24 pm – 0.85 18 6.0 –
1004 10.28.97 3 6.48 am –0.75 42 14.0 none
1005 10.28.97 4 9.42 am 0.82 27 6.8 none
1006 10.28.97 4 10.13 am 0.87 40 10.0 none (15 more during day)
1022 10.30.97 5 10.02 am – 0.88 45 9.0 none
1023 11.07.97 5 9.35 am -0.86 52 10.4 noneBIS Papers No 2 23
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1024 11.07.97 5 9.40 am 0.76 44 8.8 –
1025 12.05.97 5 8.30 am – 0.82 129 25.8 8.30 am: payrolls up 404,000.
1026 12.05.97 2 8.31 am – 0.92 151 75.5 –
1027 12.23.97 5 3.56 pm – 0.79 51 10.2 none
1028 04.30.98 2 8.31  am 0.87 154 77.0 8.30 am: employment cost index up 0.7% in first
quarter. Also GDP data released.
1029 08.04.98 4 3.43 pm – 0.93 39 9.8 none
1030 08.04.98 4 3.46 pm – 0.80 34 8.5 –
1031 08.05.98 4 9.43 am – 0.88 22 5.5 none
1032 08.05.98 4 3.45 pm 0.93 41 10.3 none
1033 08.27.98 3 11.38 am – 0.84 29 9.7 none
1034 08.27.98 4 11.41 am – 0.84 46 11.5 –
1035 08.27.98 5 2.47 pm 0.84 36 7.2 none
1036 08.27.98 5 2.48 pm 0.84 40 8.0 –
1037 08.28.98 5 11.49 am 0.77 47 9.4 none
1038 08.28.98 5 11.50 am 0.86 45 9.0 –
1039 08.31.98 4 10.09 am – 0.96 31 7.8 none
1040 08.31.98 4 3.07 pm – 0.77 47 11.8 none (10 more during day)
1051 09.01.98 2 9.32 am 0.94 19 9.5 none (21 more during day)
1073 09.02.98 3 9.37 am 0.75 30 10.0 none
1074 09.02.98 5 3.49 pm – 0.80 58 11.6
1075 09.03.98 4 9.35 am – 0.82 37 9.3 none
1076 09.03.98 5 10.30 am 0.93 47 9.4 –
1077 09.03.98 5 10.56 am – 0.77 45 9.0 –
1078 09.03.98 4 3.42 pm 0.77 37 9.3 –
1079 09.04.98 5 2.50 pm – 0.76 39 7.8 none
1080 09.04.98 5 3.39 pm 0.76 48 9.6 –
1081 09.04.98 5 3.41 pm 0.85 45 9.0 –
1082 09.10.98 5 3.36 pm – 0.80 49 9.8 none
1083 09.10.98 3 3.42 pm 0.76 37 12.3 –
1084 09.11.98 4 9.46 am 0.87 49 12.3 none
1085 09.11.98 4 9.48 am 0.77 51 12.8 –
1086 09.11.98 5 9.50 am 0.77 69 13.8 –
1087 09.11.98 3 9.53 am 0.77 36 12.0 –
1088 09.11.98 2 10.03 am 0.92 20 10.0 –
1089 09.11.98 4 2.50 pm 0.82 34 8.5 –
1090 09.11.98 4 2.51 pm 0.82 37 9.3 –
1091 09.16.98 5 3.43 pm 0.81 40 8.0 none
1092 09.29.98 2 2.17 pm – 0.89 18 9.0 2.17 pm: fed cut funds rate 25 basis points.
1093 09.29.98 2 2.18 pm – 1.08 18 9.0 –
1094 09.29.98 3 2.20 pm – 0.84 30 10.0 –
1095 10.01.98 5 11.19 am – 0.79 51 10.2 none
1096 10.02.98 5 10.18 am – 0.90 47 9.4 none
1097 10.02.98 4 12.41 pm 0.80 42 10.5 none
1098 10.02.98 5 2.52 pm 0.75 45 9.0 none
1099 10.02.98 4 3.15 pm 0.75 30 7.5 none
1100 10.05.98 4 3.37 pm 0.78 31 7.8 none
1101 10.05.98 4 3.42 pm 0.80 33 8.3 –
1102 10.05.98 4 3.43 pm 0.75 30 7.5 –
1103 10.07.98 5 10.12 am 0.91 41 8.2 none
1104 10.07.98 5 3.06 pm 0.76 41 8.2 none
1105 10.07.98 4 3.26 pm – 0.75 44 11.0 none
1106 10.07.98 5 3.41 pm 0.91 48 9.6 none
1107 10.08.98 3 9.50 am – 0.78 32 10.7 none (eight more during day)
1116 10.09.98 4 10.14 am – 0.77 31 7.8 none
1117 10.15.98 1 3.15  pm 0.89 11 11.0 3.14 pm: Fed cut funds rate and discount rate
25 basis points (not a normal FOMC meeting).
1118 10.15.98 1 3.16 pm 1.00 11 11.0
1119 10.15.98 1 3.17 pm 1.00 9 9.0 –
1120 10.15.98 1 3.18 pm 1.29 10 10.0 –24 BIS Papers No 2
k-minute-change Event
day k end time size vol. ave. vol.
1121 10.15.98 1 3.19 pm 1.00 8 8.0 –
1122 10.15.98 1 3.21 pm – 1.19 8 8.0 –
1123 10.15.98 1 3.22 pm – 1.29 7 7.0 –
1124 10.15.98 5 3.44 pm 0.80 36 7.2 –
1125 10.15.98 5 3.45 pm 0.80 34 6.8 –
1126 10.15.98 5 3.46 pm 0.80 36 7.2 –
1127 11.17.98 2 2.19  pm 0.83 19 9.5 2.15 pm: Fed cut funds rate and discount rate
25 basis points.
1128 11.17.98 2 2.20 pm 1.14 17 8.5 –
1129 01.15.99 5 7.31 am – 0.78 198 39.6 none
1130 01.15.99 4 8.10 am 0.77 102 25.5
1131 01.15.99 5 8.12 am 0.81 125 25.0
8.10 am: Estado said Brazil central bank won’t
intervene in foreign exchange market.
1132 01.15.99 5 8.16 am 0.82 159 31.8 –
1133 01.31.99 1 5.57 pm 0.85 9 9.0 none
1134 02.23.99 5 10.04 am – 0.82 68 13.6 10.00 am: Greenspan testimony; economy may be
stretched.
1135 03.05.99 2 8.31 am 1.05 152 76.0 8.30 am: payrolls up 275,000.
1136 04.16.99 4 9.48 am – 0.78 47 11.8 none
1137 04.16.99 5 1.17 pm – 0.86 54 10.8 none
1138 05.12.99 1 9.47 am – 0.81 17 17.0
1139 05.12.99 1 9.48 am – 0.81 12 12.0
?time: Rubin to announce resignation;
Summers is successor.
1140 05.12.99 1 9.50 am 0.88 12 12.0 –
1141 05.18.99 4 2.14 pm –  0.80 41 10.3 2.11 pm: Fed let rates stand; adopted tightening
bias.
1142 06.01.99 5 10.05 am – 0.85 54 10.8 10.00 am: NAPM 55.2 vs. 52.8 last month.
1143 06.04.99 3 8.33 am – 0.88 191 63.7 8.30 am: payrolls up 11,000.
1144 06.13.99 1 5.35 pm – 0.77 2 2.0 none
1145 06.15.99 1 4.19 pm – 1.01 3 3.0 none
1146 06.16.99 3 8.30 am 0.79 170 56.7 8.30 am: CPI unchanged; core up 0.1%
1147 06.30.99 2 2.17 pm 0.96 24 12.0 2:15 pm: Fed raised funds rate 25 basis points;
adapted neutral bias.
1148 06.30.99 3 2.19 pm 0.89 31 10.3 –
1149 08.06.99 2 8.30 am – 0.83 151 75.5 8.30 am: payrolls up 310,000.
1150 09.03.99 1 8.30 am 0.89 150 150.0 8.30 am: payrolls up 124,000.
1151 09.10.99 1 8.31 am 0.80 93 93.0 8.30 am: PPI up 0.5%; core down 0.1%
1152 09.15.99 1 8.30 am 0.81 106 106.0 8.30 am: CPI up 0.3% core up 0.1%.
1153 10.05.99 2 2.12 pm –  0.93 32 16.0 2.12 pm: Fed let rates stand; adopted tightening
bias.
1154 10.05.99 2 2.13 pm – 0.80 27 13.5 –
1155 10.08.99 1 8.30 am 0.75 126 126.0 8.30 am: payrolls down 8,000.
1156 10.13.99 2 4.21 pm – 0.77 5 2.5 none
1157 10.13.99 1 4.22 pm – 0.84 1 1.0 –
1158 10.15.99 1 8.30 am – 0.95 150 150.0 8.30 am: PPI up 1.1%; core up 0.8%.
1159 10.20.99 1 4.27 pm 1.21 3 3.0 none
Notes: CPI = consumer price index; core excludes food and energy. PPI = producers price index; core excludes food and energy. Percentage
changes are at monthly rates except for the change in the employment cost index, which is at quarterly rate. NAPM = National Association of
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Comments on Ray Fair’s paper
“Events that shook the market”
Eloy Lindeijer, De Nederlandsche Bank
Professor Fair’s findings highlight some of the dilemmas we face in trying to understand price
formation and market liquidity, both from a macro and a micro-economic perspective. Firstly, I would
like to express my admiration for the amount of work that has gone into collecting data on the millions
of 5 minute intervals between 1982 and 1999 and the extensive research of newswires for clues on
what might have triggered large intra-day stock price changes. As a practitioner I am appealed by the
use of tick data as it reflects the actual behaviour of financial markets, and may shed light on issues
such as market dynamics and market structure. The more common use of average daily data is less
useful in this regard. My comments on the paper are divided into three parts: general comments,
technical issues and a suggestion for further research.
General comments
One important observation is that we still do not understand what moves market prices very well. In
the paper only one third of the large price movements could be traced to a single event. Most of the
‘explainable’ events are related to data releases impacting expectations on the future course of
monetary policy. This seems to suggest that central banks still matter, which is a comforting thought if
you work for one, as I do. The fact that macro-economic data show up as an important determinant of
stock prices should not of course be too surprising given the fact that interest rates impact the cost of
capital of firms and the net present value of future earnings.
In the search for explanations of price moves it may be useful to have knowledge of the market
conditions prevailing at the time of the identified events. In particular, some of the large price changes
may have followed the breaching of important technical support and resistance levels that prevailed at
the time or may be related a lack of market liquidity. My experience with the monitoring of
developments in foreign exchange market suggests that such triggers for large-price moves are
frequent. It may also be worthwhile to look into the pattern of order flows during the course of these
days. This volume information could shed light on the depth of the market, i.e. the ability of the market
to absorb large order flows without substantial price moves. It may also shed light on the behaviour of
market participants in the minutes surrounding important data releases. I suspect a bunching of orders
and trades at these times. Thus it may be possible to filter out some cases of large intra-day price that
may be more related to market functioning than to the incorporation of new information into the
market. This may be particularly the case when the large price move does not persist during the
course of subsequent five-minute trading intervals.
Technical comments
•   With regard to the tick data, I have assumed that these data reflect prices upon which trades
(however small or large) have actually taken place. If this is not the case, for instance when
such data is based on mid-price of the best bids and offers in the central order limit book,
one has to be aware of distortions caused by widening bids and offers during moments of
market uncertainty.
•   The data shows there are several occasions of successive five-minute periods with large
price moves. This suggests that a longer period may be used in such cases to describe a
particular event.
•   The stock market crash of October 1987 is one of those ‘non explainable’ events during
which price developments and a seizing up of market liquidity reflected a widespread loss of
confidence in the stability of the financial system. The divergence of valuations in cash and
futures markets reflected a fragmentation of price discovery and market liquidity, which was
in part triggered by large delays in processing order flows. Analysis of such price
divergences on an intra-day basis may allow some judgement on the evolution of market
functioning on those tumultuous days.26 BIS Papers No 2
Suggestion for further research
The main contribution of this paper is to make an extensive database of tick data available and to link
large intra-day price moves to certain events. In addition to searching for news events that impacted
prices, further research into market conditions prevailing at the time of large price moves seems
promising. This information would be useful form a micro-economic perspective, to better understand
the functioning and structure of financial markets.
A second suggestion for further research concerns the impact of changes in the shape of the yield
curve on stock prices. Here it may be of interest to research if there are different outcomes in the case
of Nasdaq and S&P500 stocks. Some analysts have suggested the valuation of technology stocks are
less sensitive to the level of interest rates since earnings lie further in the future (in some sense
comparable with a high duration bond). Since there is also a very liquid index-futures contract on the
Nasdaq-index, it would be of interest to study differences in the behaviour of this contract vis-à-vis the
S&P futures for the large intra-day price moves in recent years.BIS Papers No 2 27
Comments on Ray Fair’s paper
“Events that shook the market”
Giuseppe Grande, Bank of Italy
Discussion
In the empirical literature, the relationship between news and asset prices has typically been analysed
by asking two different questions: What is the price impact of a certain type of news? What news has
caused a certain large price change? The first, “ex-ante”, approach is usually carried out by regressing
the changes in asset prices over a variable representing the event or its unexpected component. The
second, “ex-post”, approach is implemented in two stages: first, “large” price changes are computed
and then an event that may explain each such big move is looked for.
Recently intraday data have allowed researchers to gain more profound insights on the relationship
between asset prices and information. By using transaction data for the US bond market, Fleming and
Remolona (1999a) attempt to identify information that may account for the sharpest price changes,
and also estimate the price impact of scheduled macroeconomic announcements. Andersen and
Bollerslev (1998) address the same two key questions for the deutsche mark-dollar spot exchange
rate.
The paper by Professor Fair extends this line of research to the U.S. stock market, applying the
ex-post methodology to a huge amount of transaction data on the S&P 500 futures contract (the
sample period runs from 21 April 1982 to 29 October 1999). The paper is a major contribution that
provides a highly detailed picture of the price discovery process in the US stock market.
The results of the above-mentioned studies are quite similar for the bond and forex markets. For the
on-the-run five-year US Treasury note, Fleming and Remolona (1999a) found that, between
September 1993 and August 1994, each of the twenty-five sharpest five-minute price changes could
be associated with a just-released macroeconomic announcement. Similarly, Andersen and Bollerslev
(1998) were able to associate an event with each of the twenty-five largest five-minute jumps in the
deutsche mark-dollar exchange rate recorded between October 1992 and September 1993. In this
case, however, the events included 15 releases of macroeconomic data, eight other economic events
and three political events.
In Fair’s study of the S&P 500 futures contract, 220 of the 4417 trading days in the dataset recorded at
least one large price change. The most striking result of the paper is that events were found only for
69 of these days. The latter included 31 macroeconomic announcements, 22 monetary policy events,
seven other economic events and nine political events. These findings are consistent with those
obtained by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) for the 50 largest daily changes in the S&P 500
index from 1946 through 1987.
My brief comments will discuss three aspects of the work: (1) the definition of a “large” stock price
change; (2) the sensitivity of stock prices to news about monetary policy and the business cycle;
(3) the main finding that several stock price gaps are apparently unexplained.
Identifying “large” price changes is analogous to a problem of outlier detection. As such, it should take
into account the statistical properties of the S&P 500 transactions data, and in particular the
persistence in their volatility (Chan, Chan and Karolyi, 1991). As regards the time interval, Fair devises
a procedure that finds all the large one to five-minute changes without duplication. This is a convenient
solution. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Fair, it is important to consider that five out of the 17 price
gaps computed on daily data by Cutler, Poterba and Summers between 1982 and 1987 are not
detectable on one to five-minute data, indicating that the results are substantially affected by the
sampling frequency. The choice of the minimum size is also very important. Fair sets a level of
0.75 percent in absolute value. The choice of an unconditional threshold implies that during turmoil a
huge number of price gaps are selected, while in normal periods large jumps in prices can be missed.
The adoption of a time-varying threshold level could significantly increase the share of (conditional)
large price changes that are explained by some news event.
Table 1 clearly shows that monetary policy is a factor in stock price gaps. For instance, in the second
half of the nineties seven interest rate decisions shook the market. In that period, two Testimonies also
caused price gaps. This evidence is not surprising. Since monetary policy decisions in the US are28 BIS Papers No 2
made known in a limited number of scheduled FOMC meetings and speeches per year, market
participants tend to revise their expectation about the future stance of monetary policy in the days in
which these institutional events take place. It is also interesting to note that in the last three interest
rate shocks in 1999 that were accompanied by a statement on the bias of monetary policy it was the
latter that determined the correction in stock prices, rather than the change in the policy interest rate.
This means that market participants are ready to extract information about the future tightness of
monetary policy from any signal provided by the central bank. This fact should be taken into account
by empirical studies that attempt to identify monetary policy shocks on high frequency data by focusing
exclusively on the unexpected component of the policy interest rate.
It must be emphasised that these events represent purely exogenous monetary policy shocks. As Fair
clearly points out with respect to the first monetary surprise detected on 16 July 1982 “for all intents
and purposes one can attribute all of the price change to the money supply announcement”. As purely
discretionary monetary shocks, these events could be used to identify sectorial responses to monetary
policy shocks by carrying out event study analyses of the kind used by Fleming and Remolona
(1999b) for the bond market. (To reduce the incidence of non-synchronous trading, the analysis could
be limited to the stocks included in the S&P 100.)
While there is no doubt that at least 22 events can be directly ascribed to Fed decisions, the effect of
news about payroll, prices, etc. cannot be primarily connected with expectations about the future
stance of monetary policy. Business cycle news affects not only expected discount rates, but also
expected cash flows and expected excess returns on stocks (notably the perceived “riskiness” of
stocks). The relevance of developments in real activity for the stock market is likely to be much more
pervasive than the evidence reported in Table 1 seems to suggest. First, as noted by Fair, since many
macroeconomic announcements occur at 8.30 am, if we also had data on after-hours trading for the
period before 1994 (when the S&P 500 futures contract began to be traded on the GLOBEX market), it
is likely that many more effects of macroeconomic data would have been found. Moreover, since
information about the business cycle is dispersed over a wide set of indicators (Stock and Watson,
1999), the price impact of each data release can be limited. Finally, if we set a lower minimum level for
price gaps, we would certainly find more events linked to macroeconomic announcements. In fact,
between September 1993 and August 1994 the impact on the S&P 500 futures price of 17 relevant
macroeconomic news events was comparable to that found for bond prices (cf. Table 3).
As mentioned above, the most striking result of the paper is the huge number of large price changes
that apparently are not associated with any event, a situation that seems peculiar to the stock market.
Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) discard the possibility that market analysts can systematically
miss news about fundamental values that are instead observed by market participants, and indicate
two alternative explanations. First, large market movements may reflect changes in average
assessments of fundamental values as investors re-examine existing data or present new arguments.
Second, many investors do not trade on the basis of their own assessment of values, but rely on
market prices to gauge them-a form of departure from the assumption of rational behaviour. According
to Cutler, Poterba and Summers, the latter hypothesis would explain, for instance, why, during the
stock market crisis of October 1987, most shares were not traded despite the dramatic drop in their
prices.
Recent theoretical research has pointed out how the introduction of fundamental uncertainty in
standard equilibrium models can help replicate key aspects of financial data series, and in particular
volatility clustering and time-varying risk premia (Veronesi, 1999). If the economy shifts between two
unobservable states at random times (say, between high-growth and low-growth states), risk-averse
investors will tend to overreact to bad news in good times and to underreact to good news in bad
times, since in these cases the incoming information increases the uncertainty of investors about the
latent state of the economy. It also implies that the reaction of prices to news will tend to be large in
good times and small in bad times.
A different explanation assumes that there are investors who show some kind of cognitive bias and
limit the activity of fully rational arbitrageurs. In these cases, prices will tend to overreact or underreact
to fundamental news depending on the processes of belief formation assumed for the different types
of investors (Schleifer, 2000).
The stylised facts about stock price movements highlighted by Fair can provide a useful yardstick for
evaluating the predictive accuracy of these different explanations.
In conclusion, the paper by Professor Fair clearly shows that intraday data are well suited for
investigating the relationship between price movements and information arrival for the stock market asBIS Papers No 2 29
well. Full exploitation of the statistical properties of intraday data could substantially improve the
outcome of the signal extraction process.
In the US, monetary policy is a factor in large stock price movements. The paper identifies a number of
purely exogenous monetary policy shocks that provide suggestions for further research. Such
evidence is also relevant to the debate on whether and to what extent central banks should abstain
from monetary surprises.
The most striking feature of the US stock market is that many, if not most, large price changes are
unexplained. A theoretical explanation of this fact could be provided by recent equilibrium models that
assume rational learning or some departure from the hypothesis of rational expectations, along the
lines suggested by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) after the stock market crash of 1987.
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